ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Proxy advisory services have transformed proxy voting by institutional investors. These investors traditionally followed the Wall Street Rule-vote with management or sell.
1 This practice made incumbent managers absolute monarchs of the companies. They could be challenged only in serious proxy fights, which insurgencies were (and still are) expensive and rare. 2 Institutions followed the Wall Street Rule largely because they faced a collective action problem. 3 It is expensive for a shareholder to research the merits of every proxy issue on which it votes. This is especially true for mutual funds that typically hold stock in over 100 companies. 4 If an institution pays the costs of that research, votes for the "right" side, and by so doing causes the "right" side to win and enhances the value of the company's stock, other shareholders can "free-ride" on that effort; that is, the increase in value will be shared equally by stockholders who avoided the costs of the research. 5 Investment companies that eschew these research expenses will have a competitive cost advantage. Thus, most institutions saved costs by following the Wall Street Rule, even though the result was suboptimal corporate performance and stock price.
In the 1990s, however, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and a few other organizations appeared, offering for a fee to perform the research that most institutions shunned and to advise their clients of their findings. These services dramatically changed the costbenefit choices of institutional investors. At small cost they now could get objective, sophisticated, well-researched opinions about proxy issues. With most institutions using the service of a proxy advisor, votes against management became much more common. 6 This change offends corporate executives; they want to seize back untrammeled power. They and their allies are waging a massive campaign to hobble the proxy advisors. 7 Offering several complaints, they persuaded the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to This Article analyzes the campaign against proxy advisors. Part I describes how proxy advisors work and how influential they are. Part II reviews charges that institutional investors have improperly delegated to proxy advisors their fiduciary duty to vote their shares with due care. Part III discusses the claim that ISS holds a damaging monopoly over proxy advisory services. Part IV considers the allegations that proxy advisors make many factual errors, that their activities lack transparency, and that their policies are misguided. Part V examines arguments that proxy advisors should be deemed fiduciaries for their clients and that they have conflicts of interest that should be regulated or prohibited. Part VI weighs other proposals to regulate proxy advisors.
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCE OF PROXY ADVISORY SERVICES
The biggest proxy advisor is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which is owned by Vestar Capital Partners. 10 At the end of 2009, it had 2,970 clients, 11 more than all other proxy advisors combined.
12 ISS also performs two other services. It publishes corporate governance ratings for thousands of public companies that are used by some investors as indicia of the quality of a company's corporate governance. 13 governance ratings.
14 ISS also offers corporate governance advisory services to public companies. 15 The second largest proxy advisor is Glass, Lewis & Co. ISS and Glass Lewis together have over 90% of the proxy advisor market. 16 Glass Lewis has grown and by 2011 had over 40% of the market. 17 The potential influence of proxy advisors is considerable. As of 2007, investment funds alone owned about 24% of publicly traded American corporate stock, and this figure has been rising constantly for decades. 18 There is disagreement about how influential proxy advisors actually are. Some claim that ISS alone controls one-third or more of the shareholder votes of many issuers. 19 However, one study found that ISS recommendations swayed only 6% to 10% of the institutional votes. 20 14. See Tamara C. Belinfanti These widely divergent figures reflect the difficulty of distinguishing statistical correlation from causation. ISS is not the sole public voice on proxy issues. 21 Some institutions employ more than one proxy advisor. 22 Many large institutions rely more on their in-house proxy analysts than they do on ISS.
23 Some non-profit organizations offer proxy voting advice. 24 Shareholder proposals come with their own supporting statements by the proponent. And, of course, managements propagate their own views through the company proxy statement and other forms of proxy solicitation.
When ISS agrees with others, it is impossible to say that ISS "caused" the votes consistent with its advice. An institution may choose a proxy advisor whose philosophy it shares. 25 There is "a substantial correlation between proxy advisor recommendations and the factors that academics, policy makers, and the media have identified as important."
26 Thus, there are usually several vectors pushing in the same direction as proxy advisors' recommendations. Arguably, then, "the proxy firms' positions essentially mirror the Institutions rely less on proxy advisors with respect to "certain highprofile or controversial proxy issues, such as mergers and  acquisitions or executive compensation." 33 Thus, the influence of proxy advisors seems to be greatest where it is least important.
Several independent outside observers have found that the overall influence of proxy advisors is not great. A General Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded "that the overall influence of advisory firms on proxy vote outcomes may be limited." 34 An empirical study found that the influence of ISS is exaggerated and that "proxy advisors act primarily as agents or intermediaries which aggregate information that investors find important in determining how to vote in director elections rather than as independent power centers." 35 Another study found that "reliance on management appears to be more significant than reliance on ISS. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 2008) , available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127282; see also BEW & FIELDS, supra note 27, at 2, 13 (stating that proxy advisors are valued by institutions as "data aggregators"). A proxy advisor also makes information easier for the investor to absorb by presenting it in a common format for all issuers. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 150 (citing remarks of Michael Ryan, Vice President, Business Roundtable, stating that proxy advisors "take and distill the information" and "standardize the ability to read" it); see also id. at 63 (citing remarks of Damon Silvers, Director of Policy and Special Counsel, AFL-CIO, stating that proxy advisors "produce extremely detailed analyses of things that in many cases have been essentially rendered intentionally obscure in the proxy process").
36 However, the influence of proxy advisors may extend beyond their impact on proxy votes. In order to get favorable recommendations on proxy votes and positive corporate governance ratings, many public companies tailor their executive compensation schemes, responses to shareholder proposals, and corporate governance practices to the standards of the leading proxy advisors.
37
This influence cannot be measured precisely, but it may be largely the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In an effort to convince the SEC to hobble proxy advisors with regulation, corporate executives and their minions have trafficked inflated estimates of the advisors' influence. Ironically, many of these people seem to have been fooled by their own propaganda and kowtow to ISS more than they need to.
38
That may not be a bad thing. Corporations may improve their performance by adopting the views of proxy advisors even if they need not do so to gain shareholder approval. Moreover, the rise of proxy advisors and hedge funds has forced corporations to change their attitudes toward their large shareholders. Formerly these investors got no attention from management beyond the press releases available to everyone. Now managers actively seek out major shareholders so as to solicit their views and explain managements' conduct.
39
In any case, it would make no sense to increase regulation of proxy advisors just because some people mistakenly believe that advisors wield great influence. The evidence that the influence of It is impossible to say how much influence ISS exerted, however, because ISS's recommendations are not random but are based on the contents of the proposed pay plan and on the performance of the company. Id. at 984, 989-90. It is impossible to say how much "against" votes are induced by these factors and how much they are independently influenced by ISS's recommendations. 40 Critics charge that many institutional investors have improperly delegated their proxy-voting decisions to their proxy advisors. 41 They add that the SEC has abetted this problem by requiring asset managers to vote proxies they hold in the best interests of their clients, 42 but allowing them to rely on proxy advisors to discharge that duty. 43 They urge the SEC either to retract the requirement to vote proxies (so that institutions could abstain) or to declare that reliance on a proxy advisor is not enough to satisfy an institution's fiduciary duty in proxy voting. 45 Others have an announced policy of generally following advisor recommendations. 46 However, each institution retains ultimate control over its voting; it may withdraw authority from ISS in individual cases or rescind its authority completely. 47 Every fiduciary is free to rely on experts so long as the fiduciary makes the ultimate decision. Thus, the SEC statements allowing asset managers to rely on proxy advisors did not confer any new permission. Directors of corporations (including investment companies) are not required or expected to be experts in all aspects of their business. 48 They must follow expert advice in the many areas that require special expertise. Boards do not fashion corporate business strategy from scratch; they assign certain agents-the company's executives-to draft a business plan, which the board reviews and, typically, approves.
49
It would be impractical and negligent for the board of any institution that holds stock in several public companies to discuss and resolve at a board meeting every proxy resolution that the institution faces. Directors have neither the time nor the expertise to do that; they need expert advice. The experts may be company that clearly articulates the [proxy voting] responsibilities" of portfolio managers, but not stating what those principles should be); see also Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 430 (seeming to agree with this recommendation); Policymakers Must Question, supra note 41, at 977 (citing SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher as urging the SEC to take unspecified steps "'to ensure that advisers to institutional investors . . . are not over-relying on analyses by proxy advisory firms'").
45. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 386. In addition, "[m]any institutional investors vote in lockstep with the recommendations of proxy advisory firms." Gow, supra note 5, at 1, 5 exh. 1. These tend to be the smaller funds. Larger funds rely more on internal staffs and often have "client-specific custom policies." See infra notes 67-68, 81 and accompanying text.
46. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 410-11 (giving examples). 47. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 16-17 ("[W]hether large or small, all of the institutional investors we spoke with explained that they retain the fiduciary obligation to vote proxies in the best interest of their clients irrespective of their reliance on proxy advisory firms.").
48. Delaware courts will not even ask whether a director's decision was reasonable much less whether the directors possessed some degree of skill. employees or outsiders. 50 Indeed, one of the most fundamental tasks of any board is to decide what functions the company will perform in-house and which will be outsourced. 51 Economists call this the "make or buy" decision. 52 There is no reason why proxy voting should be singled out and excluded from the directors' general right to rely on experts.
Corporate executives and their allies routinely insist that directors be allowed to act with minimal interference from courts or administrative agencies. These groups have never complained when institutional investors followed the Wall Street Rule and automatically voted with management. Thus it is suspicious that they call for restricting boards' right to rely on experts only when it is reliance on proxy advisors.
For proxy voting, the advantages of using an outsider are obvious. The primary goal of institutional investors is to maximize the value of their portfolios. 53 It makes economic sense to pay a third party a small fee (which is also charged to many other investors holding the same stock) to research whether each proxy resolution serves that goal rather than to incur the expense of doing that research in-house. Moreover, similar proxy resolutions, like those relating to executive compensation, arise at hundreds of publicly traded companies. A single institution may hold stock in just a few companies with a particular proxy issue, so it might not make economic sense for it to research that issue extensively, especially if 52. Ronald Coase first framed the theory of the firm based on the distinction between which functions were more economically performed within the entity and which were better contracted for in the market, which was later coined the "make or buy decision." See id. it is a small institutional investor. 54 However, for ISS, which researches hundreds of issuers with resolutions on a given subject, it makes excellent sense to develop expertise on that subject.
The need for outside expertise is much greater now than it was just twenty years ago. By giving shareholders a say-on-pay, the Dodd-Frank Act requires them to vote on detailed compensation plans, something that was almost never submitted to shareholders before. 55 Also, twenty years ago shareholder resolutions on corporate governance almost never passed, so an institutional investor might have deemed it unimportant how it voted on these matters. Now, such resolutions are usually hotly contested and often pass. The key reason for this overall downward trend appears to be a shift from more popular proposals to less appealing ideas. . . . As [the more popular] ideas have been adopted, . . . they are less likely to be the subject of shareholder proposals, for the simple reason that they are no longer relevant for many companies. Id. at 18. It is also likely that issuers have become more sophisticated in dealing with shareholder dissatisfaction and shareholder proposals. For example, many issuers admit to adopting ISS's guidelines on executive compensation. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Such behavior reduces the chances that an issuer will face a serious shareholder challenge. Moreover, many companies that do receive a serious challenge either concede without a fight or compromise with the proponents. For example, shareholders dislike staggered boards of directors, but they alone cannot change them in Delaware because provisions for staggered boards are contained in the charter, which cannot be amended without a positive vote of both the board and the shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § § 141(d), 242(b) (2014). Nonetheless, ninety-seven companies that received proposals in 2012-2013 to de-stagger their recently, nearly all American corporations had plurality voting for the board of directors. Except in the rare case of a serious proxy contest, election of the company's official slate of nominees was automatic, so institutions might have thought it irrelevant how they voted. Now, most corporations have majority voting, and it is not uncommon for official candidates to fail to get a majority vote. 57 Also, SEC regulations now require issuers to disclose more information, which increases the burden of researching proxy issues. 58 The results of all these changes are that shareholders are now asked to vote on more issues than before, disclosures are more complex, and more issues are seriously contested so that an institution's vote is now more likely to make a difference. 59 These changes would drastically increase costs to institutional investors if they had to perform all research in-house. 60 Use of a proxy advisor is far wiser.
To follow anyone's advice unthinkingly would be an improper delegation of a fiduciary's duty, but that is not what institutions have done with proxy voting. 61 First, an advisor is not chosen at random. Instead, most institutional investors "determine which proxy advisor has a voting policy they most agree with." 62 To the extent that institutions vote with ISS and Glass Lewis it is because they "have some common views on corporate governance." 63 Some institutions also subscribe to more than one proxy advisory firm and consider the recommendations of all of them. 64 Advisors publicize their general policies and specific recommendations. 65 Sometimes they disagree among themselves.
66
Many institutions (especially the larger ones) maintain internal staffs to research proxy issues, and they often reject the advice of a proxy advisor and follow the contrary recommendations of their own staffs.
67
Over 400 institutions do not accept the standard voting recommendations of a proxy advisor but have "client-specific custom policies" that are "implemented on behalf of clients tailored to their investment philosophies" and which together total over "50 percent of ballots that flow through ISS' voting system." 68 67. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 16 (stating that fifteen of twenty large institutions interviewed by the GAO "reported that they generally rely more on their own in-house research and analyses to make voting decisions than on the research and recommendations provided by their proxy advisory services"); see also Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 53 (citing remarks of Lynn Turner, Manager Director, LitiNomics, Inc., stating that her institution voted against management more often than Glass Lewis so recommended).
68 hardly surprising. ISS is a business; it has no reason to pursue an independent agenda and every reason to please its customers.
More important, although ISS and Glass Lewis may dominate among proxy advisors, proxy advisors are far from the sole voices on proxy issues. For many institutions, the recommendations of a proxy advisor are just "one of many inputs" in deciding how to vote. 70 Public pension funds are vocal shareholders. 71 Four public pension funds and one foundation work with the Shareholders Rights Project (SRP) at Harvard Law School on certain issues relating to corporate governance. 72 The SRP not only provides an alternative source of advice for the institutions that work with it, but also publicizes its views for other institutions to consider. Some large institutions publish in advance their own positions on proxy issues. 73 Other institutions are free to adopt these positions.
The 77 By contrast, proxy challengers must fund their campaigns out of their own pockets. As a result, only thirty-nine of SRP's resolutions were approved by shareholders in 2012, and nineteen were carried in 2013. 78 These results do not indicate that institutional investors are blindly following proxy advisors-or anyone else-in their proxy voting.
"In addition, large and small institutional investors reported that they tend to provide greater in-house scrutiny to, and rely even less on, proxy advisory firm recommendations about certain highprofile or controversial proxy issues, such as mergers and acquisitions or executive compensation."
79 Even those who allege undue reliance by institutions on proxy advisors tend to acknowledge an exception "for votes with clear economic significance (such as mergers or election contests)." 80 Thus, institutions' reliance on proxy advisors may be significant primarily for smaller institutions 81 and in fairly routine and uncontested matters.
82
Some have expressed skepticism about "institutional investors' insistence that they make independent decisions notwithstanding ISS's influence. Yes, some do. But how many institutional investors would actually confess . . . 'Yep, most of the time I just vote the way (quoting one asset manager as saying, "'We talked to about 400 issuers last year about compensation'").
77. they tell me.'" 83 However, the professionals interviewed by the GAO agreed "that large institutional investors would be likely to use proxy advisory firms as one of several factors they consider in the research and analysis they perform."
84 "The influence of ISS is thus mostly due to funds' measured evaluation of the ISS recommendations, with significant thinking on their own, rather than to funds' blindly following these recommendations." 85 Restricting the use of proxy advisors by institutional investors would have several negative consequences. Probably no fund would respond by creating a large in-house staff to research all proxy issues; that is not economically practicable. 86 If proxy advisors have been compelled to "automate their decision-making processes" by the "sheer volume of shareholder votes," 87 even the largest institutional investors could not hope to study every voting decision. Rather, most institutions (especially the smaller ones) would revert to their former practices-generally following the Wall Street Rule by voting for management. 88 The result would not be more independent evaluation of proxy issues by institutional investors but delegation of decisions by default to the issuer's management. Of course, this is probably just the result that the foes of proxy advisors want.
If institutions were forced to handle proxy voting in-house, holdings would require less expense for research. However, diversification is an axiom of modern investment theory. 90 In particular, institutional investors would divest stocks of smaller companies, for which holdings are likely to be smaller and for which the costs of proxy research would be harder to justify. This would be undesirable at a time when the number of publicly traded companies is already falling. It would also discourage investment in foreign companies, thereby increasing the investment risks of excessive dependence on the American economy.
Many mutual funds have conflicts of interest that incline them to vote with the issuer's management. 91 Some funds offer various corporate services, and therefore have an incentive to curry favor with managers of current and potential clients by voting shares of those companies that they own in line with the managers' wishes.
92
Thus, "the greater the dependency of [a mutual fund family] upon [corporate clients] for asset management business, the less likely the fund family will be to support shareholder-sponsored governance resolutions."
93 Thus, the recommendations of proxy advisors offset (but only somewhat) the tendency of institutions to vote with management.
Thus, restricting the use of proxy advisors would harm the institutional investors' own shareholders-the very people whom the critics of proxy advisors supposedly want to help. It would favor larger institutions because they could better absorb the increased costs of proxy voting. The increased costs would be passed along to the institutions' own investors, who would therefore suffer lower returns. These consequences seem unjustifiable when the corresponding benefits are dubious.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that institutional investors not vote at all on substantive issues. 94 The idea is that if institutions 94. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 6-9. Institutions could submit a proxy simply to be present so as to satisfy the quorum requirement. Current cannot cast a carefully, independently informed vote on an issue, they should simply abstain. This, too, is transparently self-serving advice from the minions of corporate executives. Many issuers still require only a plurality vote for election to the board. In these elections, abstentions are irrelevant since the official nominee can be elected with just a handful of votes from insiders. Further, as noted, many institutions are rationally reluctant to vote at all. 95 For them, "mandatory voting facilitates a solution to the shareholders' collective action problem."
96
Shareholder resolutions require a majority vote. Managers routinely oppose these resolutions, and institutions are likely to vote with management unless a resolution is supported by its proxy advisor. If proxy advisors are put out of business or reduced to insignificance, shareholder resolutions will become less effective. Moreover, if abstention becomes more common it will become even easier than it is now for boards of firms with majority voting for directors to leave in place a director who has not received a majority vote.
97
The proxy advisory industry began largely because institutions sought expert help on voting. 98 The rise of proxy advisors seems to have enhanced stock values. 99 Regulation restricting the use of proxy advisors would reverse this trend; if some institutions cease to use proxy advisors, the advisors must raise their fees or reduce their services. Either response will cause more institutions to drop the service. Thus costs could spiral up, the collective action problem would resurface, and proxy voting would become less effective.
The purpose of the shareholder franchise is that managers should be accountable to shareholders and not absolute autocrats. 100 federal regulations require (or seem to require) institutions to vote on substantive issues, so these regulations would have to be amended to allow routine abstention. Only if we want to rescind shareholder democracy does it make sense to forbid reliance on proxy advisors. Put another way, the question is whether it is better to have major influence from proxy advisors or to have managerial autocracy. The former, though imperfect, is clearly the better alternative. 101 
III. MONOPOLY
Critics claim that ISS exerts excessive influence because it enjoys a virtual monopoly in the proxy advisory industry. 102 As discussed above, claims of ISS's domination are exaggerated, partly because institutions have both additional outside sources and internal staffs for advice on how to vote. 103 Nonetheless, the claims of monopoly deserve some discussion.
ISS and Glass Lewis together have over 90% of the proxy advisory market. 104 High startup costs pose a daunting barrier to entry by newcomers. 105 Although ISS and Glass Lewis compete with each other and with several smaller advisory firms, it is alleged that "[n]o sane institutional investor is going to assume the risk inherent in moving thousands of accounts and ballots from ISS to another provider. The chance that accounts would be lost, not voted, or voted incorrectly is far too great."
106
This concern seems overblown. First, only 15% to 20% of mutual funds have given ISS authority to vote their shares.
107
Although this is a substantial number, most mutual funds can switch advisors without incurring this risk. Further, no institutional investor has ever been held liable for failing to vote proxies or voting them "incorrectly," so the risk of liability for an institution switching to a new proxy advisor seems nonexistent. 102. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 76-78 (alleging that ISS lacks serious competition); Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 411-17 (alleging that "ISS currently operates without significant competitive pressure"); GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 13-15 (referring to ISS's "dominance in the proxy advisory industry").
103. Although concentration is a concern in any industry, it is not clear that it has caused any problems in this case. ISS is not alleged to reap monopoly profits; even its critics acknowledge that its advisory operations are not very profitable. 108 Even if we assume that the smaller proxy advisors do not give stiff competition to the duopoly of ISS and Glass Lewis, the ability of these two to extract supra-competitive profits is limited by the option of large institutions to perform proxy analysis in-house and of smaller institutions to follow the Wall Street Rule or some other simple formula for voting.
There is some slight evidence that ISS pressures issuers to retain its consulting services by giving more favorable proxy voting recommendations to companies that do so. 109 However, that practice seems to dissipate when Glass Lewis, which does not offer such consulting services, also gives proxy advice concerning an issuer.
110
Glass Lewis has now grown and holds over 40% of the proxy advisory market.
111 If ISS once had market power that allowed it to indulge in this practice, that power may be evaporating.
Further, the success of ISS and Glass Lewis is not alleged to stem from predation. 112 It seems, rather, the product of economies of scale. Indeed some of the GAO's interviewees "questioned whether the market could sustain the current number of firms." 113 Accordingly, it does not seem that restructuring the industry would have much impact in the long term since economics would push the industry toward renewed concentration. Perhaps the most telling evidence against the monopoly-profits thesis is that the proxy advisors' clients-those who would be injured by excessive feesare not complaining. 114 Ironically, proposals to regulate or limit the use of proxy advisors would exacerbate rather than alleviate concentration in the industry. If new measures reduced the use of proxy advisors, ISS could survive the decline, but smaller advisors might not. Further, the costs of regulation are more easily borne by large firms than by 108 small firms. 115 The costs of the added regulations sought by critics of proxy advisors might increase rather than reduce concentration in the industry.
Thus, the complaints of monopoly seem intended more to harass proxy advisors than to remedy any real problems in the industry. Corporate managers dislike the large proxy advisors not because their fees are too high but because of the voting advice they give. However, the dominance of ISS and Glass Lewis suggests the soundness of their general approach to corporate governance issues. If their advice did not generally advance shareholder interests, competitors could lure away many of their clients by offering a different philosophy. Several institutions interviewed by the GAO reported that they "subscribe to ISS's services . . . because they . . . trust it to provide reliable, efficient services."
116 Only because there is little disagreement among proxy advisors about their basic approach do the economies of scale enjoyed by the larger firms become dispositive.
If public issuers and their allies think that proxy advisors are doing a poor job, they can create their own proxy advisor to offer better service. This has not happened, which strongly suggests that competitors do not detect any fundamental client dissatisfaction with the industry leaders.
117
Some complain that proxy advisors influence proxy voting even though they have no "skin in the game." 118 The charge is ironic because it is often alleged by corporate managers and their allies that the views of institutional investors are tainted because stock holdings make them short-term oriented and that this bias must be rectified by assigning firm governance to a board dominated by outside directors who have little "skin in the game" and, therefore, can be objective 115. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55. 116. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 13. 117. Some competitors "have attempted to differentiate themselves from ISS by . . . emphasizing that they provide only proxy advisory services and not corporate consulting services." GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5. Their evident purpose is to avoid the conflict of interest that some have ascribed to ISS. See infra Part V. Also, "some firms have started to focus their research and recommendation services on particular types of proxy issues or on issues specific to individual corporations." GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 14. However, no competitor has marketed a fundamentally different philosophy of corporate governance than ISS's. and dispassionate. 119 The charge is further ironic because executives and their allies invariably reject complaints that many corporate directors own little stock in their companies and, therefore, have little "skin in the game." Again, the complaints against proxy advisors seem more self-interested than principled.
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCURACY

A. Disclosure of Methodologies
One of [sic] most troubling developments with respect to proxy advisory firm analysis is the number and scope of inaccuracies in the research reports they produce on corporate issuers and a general lack of transparency in many of the methodologies, metrics and decision processes utilized by them to make voting recommendations.
120
Proxy advisors already disclose much more than just their voting recommendations and corporate governance ratings, including much underlying data that they review and the general principles that they follow.
121 ISS publishes its corporate governance policies annually.
122 Every year there are changes, and ISS has recently added a feature to its website that allows an issuer to verify data underlying ISS's evaluation of its compensation plan. 123 If issuers feel that proxy advisors' disclosures are inadequate, they can individually or collectively present their case to shareholders, and they do so. 128 Dissatisfaction seems to be limited to the managers of issuers whose monopoly on corporate power has been weakened by the proxy advisors.
Increasing the disclosure obligations of proxy advisors would increase their costs, which would have to be passed on to their clients. However, their services are not mandatory. Faced with higher fees, some institutions would probably just drop the service, which would require imposition of even higher fees on the shrinking client base. At the least this would mean many more institutions voting their shares blindly-quite possibly by following the Wall Street Rule. At the worst, it could destroy the economic viability of the proxy advisors. That is undoubtedly the result for which corporate executives and their hired guns hope.
Proxy advisors' recommendations are currently exempt from SEC regulation of proxy solicitations. 129 It has been proposed that proxy advisors be compelled to disclose the methodologies they use to make recommendations and compute corporate governance ratings. 130 This would be unwise. Proxy advisors' clients are large, sophisticated institutions. Any client that wants more information from a proxy advisor can demand it and take its business elsewhere if that information is denied. Clients are not demanding more information from proxy advisors; they seem satisfied with the status quo. Increased disclosure requirements would raise advisors' costs (and fees) without generating much benefit.
The required disclosures would also include valuable proprietary information. 131 Proxy advisors' product is their advice. Requiring them to disclose their methodologies would be like requiring a chef to disclose her recipes. Competitors might use information released by ISS to make their own recommendations without bearing the costs that ISS incurred to conduct research and formulate its voting policies and corporate governance ratings.
B. Factual Errors by Proxy Advisors
Proxy advisors are accused of committing many significant factual errors in their research reports. 133 One alleged reason for errors or poor judgment by proxy advisors is [t] he sheer volume of shareholder votes requiring recommendations each year, numbering in the tens of thousands, which is straining the capacity of the proxy advisors' production system and jeopardizing the integrity and credibility of the output. The large and growing number of annual voting recommendations, largely crammed into a four-month proxy season, dictates that proxy advisors automate their decision-making processes to the greatest extent feasible and that both inputs and outputs be as simple as 130. Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 434-35; CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 86; Wilczek, Nasdaq Petitions SEC, supra note 7, at 1927-28 (requesting mandatory disclosure of "'the models, formulas and methodologies pursuant to which [proxy advisers] evaluate and make recommendations regarding how shareholders should vote'" (quoting Nasdaq's petition)).
131 It is further alleged that all this has led to "[g]rowing discontent on the part of companies and company advisers with the one-size-fits-all analytics used by proxy advisory firms, as well as with the lack of transparency of the firms' analytics and the lack of satisfactory processes for correction of errors and of opportunities for questioning conclusions." 135 Critics want proxy advisors to commit greater resources so as to exercise "due care" and achieve "completeness" in their analyses.
136
How accurate is the charge of frequent errors? The Center On Executive Compensation (COEC) made the claim based on two surveys by COEC's parent, HR Policy Association, of its own members-that is, public companies. "Of those responding [in one survey], 53 percent said that a proxy advisory firm had made one or more mistakes in a final published report on the company's compensation programs."
137
The indictment has several flaws. First, COEC does not report what percent of the companies surveyed bothered to respond. Presumably those that believed they had been victims of errors would be more likely to respond. Second, nearly half of respondents reported no errors.
138 Third, we are not told how many reports were filed or how many years were covered. The 53% figure seems to include any company that reported a single error in any year by any proxy advisor.
Most important, we have no way of knowing how significant these errors were or even if the charges are true. Many complaints alleged use of an improper peer group or peer data.
139 Issuers who 134. APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1. 135. Id. The same report alleges that proxy advisors use "inflexible, onesize-fits-all voting policies and simplistic analytic models designed to utilize standard and easily accessible inputs that can be derived from readily available data and to avoid any need for particularized research or the application of meaningful judgment." Id. at 4; see also Che Odom, Directors: On Compensation, Proxy Advisers Missing Mark, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE REP. (BNA), at 6 (Jan. 6, 2014) (quoting a former executive as saying that on say-on-pay proxy advisors "base their advice on inflexible models that don't take into account many variables unique to a company").
136 believe that such an error has occurred can present their cases to the advisor, and many do. 140 In 96% of such complaints about a draft report, the statements were not adjusted in the final report. 141 This suggests that the proxy advisor simply disagreed with the issuer about the proper peer group or data.
142
Information is never complete. Under the principle of bounded rationality, decision makers must first decide how much information to gather before making a substantive decision. 143 In business, this is a matter of business judgment with which courts rarely interfere.
144
Corporate executives would be outraged if the SEC tried to dictate required levels of investigation in other areas. Similarly, the SEC should not dictate standards of investigation for proxy advisors. The market-that is, the proxy advisors' clients-will dictate the proper level of research.
The COEC report specifically suggests that "inaccuracies at ISS [may be] negatively impacting the compensation programs at a meaningful number of companies."
145 However, COEC presents no evidence of "inaccuracies" beyond the general and bare management complaints already mentioned. Of course, if ISS does commit an error, issuers may solicit shareholders (as proxy advisors may not) and seek to correct it. COEC does not say how many of the plans opposed by ISS were actually disapproved by shareholders or how 140. See Strine, supra note 118, at 688 ("[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views . . . .").
141. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 58. 142.
[O]ften what a corporation indicates is an error is ultimately a difference in interpretation or opinion regarding a certain issue, and therefore requires no correction. As of May 31, 2013, material errors in Glass Lewis' research (brought to our attention by the company, its advisors or through subsequent disclosure) that resulted in a change to the Glass Lewis recommendation represented one-tenth of 1% of the items up for vote at US companies analyzed by Glass Lewis. many of those plans were actually altered as a result of the negative vote. In general, executive compensation has continued to rise far faster than the rate of inflation or of the growth of the economy, 146 so it does not seem that proxy advisors' errors have caused a general impairment of executive pay (although it might not be a bad thing if it had). In sum, we have no solid evidence of how many errors proxy advisors have committed or whether those errors have caused any damage.
Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory
Accepting, however, that accuracy is better than error, we should ask what remedies are proposed to reduce errors. Some comments made to the SEC in response to its Proxy Concept Release 147 urged that proxy advisors "be required to allow companies to review and comment on their research before it is issued, at least to permit correction of factual errors, and that they be required to be far more transparent about their internal decision making processes and outcomes."
148 Others would require "consideration of each company's particular circumstances." issuer's proxy statement, and it must then deliver its report to its clients in time for them to vote. Issuers are already free to object to a report and seek corrections, 150 but the schedules for proxy votes leave little time for this process. 151 A regulatory "right to correct" would have to be accompanied by a rule revision requiring issuers to file their proxy statements sooner (which no issuer has recommended), or it would leave proxy advisors unable to deliver their reports in time to be considered by their clients.
Further, with a "right to correct," issuers' lawyers could easily devise and publish a standard-form complaint to be filed by every issuer that receives an unfavorable recommendation. The form complaint would charge that the advisor failed to consider the "company's particular circumstances" 152 and reached unwarranted conclusions. For each complaint, the advisor would presumably have to provide a hearing before a disinterested arbiter and prepare a detailed answer to the complaint. Every recommendation to vote against management would lead to an expensive dispute. Presumably, due process would also require the same right to a hearing for the supporters of every shareholder resolution that received a negative recommendation from an advisor.
The charge of a one-size-fits-all approach is at best grossly exaggerated. 153 ISS has a sophisticated approach to evaluate "pay for performance" that makes several distinctions. 154 Moreover, proxy advisors offer clients custom voting policies, which further belies the one-size-fits-all charge. 155 It is true, however, that ISS does not make the kind of individualized review that each board of directors makes when adopting an executive compensation plan. Indeed, given the hundreds of thousands of resolutions on which ISS makes recommendations, it could not make such a review within a workable cost structure. As critics acknowledge, providing recommendations on every resolution for thousands of companies is already a "monumental task."
156 Requiring further customization would raise advisors' costs-and fees.
Given the heavy burden that the regulations recommended by critics would impose, it is unsurprising that even COEC is ambivalent about greater regulation of proxy advisors, recognizing that increased regulation would increase costs and that the "impact of these increased costs would likely be most significant . . . for smaller firms in the industry and potential new entrants, rather than on the industry leaders."
157 As COEC says, proxy advisor errors arise from "lack of adequate resources and quality control procedures, pressures on the industry to reduce costs and the extremely short turnaround time available for proxy analyses."
158 Regulation cannot change these factors for the better. The market exerts a cost-benefit analysis that seems to result in the proper degree of care and accuracy in proxy advisors' reports. It is not clear that these findings are accurate. One other study found that high scores on ISS's Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) were associated with higher current stock returns, higher accounting returns, lower volatility, and higher dividends, although this study was backward-looking and did not address the predictive value of the CGQ.
162 Another backward-looking study found that companies with high ISS corporate governance ratings were less likely to use opportunistic timing of executive stock options. 163 It is also possible that the criteria used in the more recent study failed to detect the benefits of the corporate governance ratings. 164 ISS also revises its policies continually 165 and has revised them several times since that study was published. 166 It is possible that corporate governance ratings have improved since the critical studies were conducted. The study questioning the value of proxy advisors' say-on-pay policies is also dubious. Say-on-pay is an issue on which institutions rely heavily on proxy advisors. 167 In general, giving shareholders a say on pay seems to have been beneficial both here and abroad. 168 ISS recommendations in support of dissident shareholders have been "associated with positive abnormal [stock] returns." 169 These facts suggest that the policies of proxy advisors are not misguided.
However, even if ISS's corporate governance ratings have little predictive value and proxy advisors' voting recommendations are suboptimal, it is not clear that the government should step in. Any restriction on issuing ratings could violate the First Amendment and squelch the search for useful ratings. 170 Issuers and critics of the ratings are free to voice their objections and have done so. 171 Their efforts may have succeeded. One study found that corporate governance ratings had very little effect on the outcomes of shareholder voting. 172 Investors can decide for themselves how much to credit these ratings; there is no need for government intrusion.
A related criticism is that "proxy advisory firms are working hand-in-hand with unions and other activist institutional shareholders to impose social agendas on corporations that are immaterial to the business interests of the companies and their shareholders." 173 174 Moreover, proxy advisors may be even less influential on "social responsibility" issues than on other questions. 175 Institutional shareholders are not complaining about ISS's policies. 176 If there were latent dissatisfaction, competitors would certainly exploit it by highlighting their policy differences. They do not. Other than proclaiming their overall quality, the smaller proxy advisors seek to differentiate themselves from ISS by stressing that they have no conflicts of interest because they do not offer corporate governance consulting services, not by offering different policies.
177
Regulation to hobble proxy advisors might not even benefit the corporate managers who are pushing such regulation. Some investors vote against management more often than their proxy advisor recommends, 178 which suggests that whatever influence proxy advisors have may be less anti-management than many managers seem to believe. Also, the influence of hedge funds and other activist investors has mushroomed in recent years. 179 In battles over firm policy, managers must persuade shareholders that their opposition to the activist furthers the interests of the shareholders and not just the managers' own interests. 184. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2014). The SEC believes that whether a proxy advisor must register under the Act "depends on several factors." Concept Release, supra note 129, at 112. The statute defines "investment adviser" as any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling inaccurate or incomplete information." 192 The question here would be what constitutes a "reasonable investigation" when a firm makes recommendations on tens of thousands of resolutions involving thousands of companies.
As a registered investment advisor, ISS is already subject to fiduciary duties. 193 No complaints have been filed against it for failing to discharge these duties. Compelling smaller proxy advisors to register would accomplish nothing but to impose extra costs on them. The added costs could force them out of business, thereby reducing competition. As already discussed, market forces will induce the proper level of care; further SEC regulation is not needed and could be counterproductive. 194 ISS has also been accused of two kinds of conflicts of interest. First, it "advises institutional investor clients on how to vote their proxies and at the same time provides consulting services to help corporations develop management proposals and improve their corporate governance. . . . [T]his could lead corporations to feel obligated to retain ISS's consulting services in order to obtain favorable proxy vote recommendations." 195 The COEC believes that it is "impossible for a proxy advisory firm to provide both [consulting services to corporate issuers and proxy voting advice] and still meet their fiduciary obligations to institutional investors."
196
It therefore calls on the SEC to ban the practice.
197
ISS dismisses this concern for two reasons. First, it discloses information about its potential conflicts. 198 Second, its proxy advisory and corporate consulting businesses have separate staff, operate in separate buildings, and use segregated office equipment and information databases. 199 services, they can say so individually and collectively. Investors can decide whom to believe.
COEC suggests that ISS's consulting services may subsidize its advisory business. 205 Perhaps the critics hope that curbing or ending ISS's consulting activities would put it out of business or force it to raise fees for its proxy advisory services, thereby losing many costconscious clients, and that this would reduce ISS's influence, to the benefit of corporate executives. Even without regulation, however, the growth of Glass Lewis may be diminishing the ability of ISS to extort issuers. 206 Since the consequences of restricting or banning ISS's consulting services are so uncertain and ISS's proxy advice clients are not complaining, the case for regulation is not compelling.
Another alleged conflict is that proxy advisors give recommendations on shareholder proposals and "vote no" campaigns proposed by client firms. 207 The concern is that "proxy advisory firms will make favorable recommendations to other institutional investor clients on such proposals in order to maintain the business of the investor clients that submitted these proposals."
208 This does not seem to be a major problem. First, the critics offer no evidence that advisors discard their usual principles to support proxy campaigns by their clients or that shareholder campaigns are favored more often by proxy advisors hired by the proponent than by other proxy advisors. 209 The burden of proof should be on those seeking further regulation, and they have not sustained that burden.
Further, if shareholder activists succeed, in most cases they get no more pro rata benefit than any other shareholder. In these cases there is no reason to fear that the proxy advisor is favoring the proponent at the expense of its other clients. If the proponent does stand to gain some special benefit or has some non-economic (e.g., political) agenda, issuers are free and able to point that out.
Any institution that is troubled by ISS's supposed conflicts is free to switch advisors. However, all the institutions that the GAO interviewed "said that they are satisfied with the steps that ISS has taken to mitigate its potential conflicts." 210 Clients of ISS are also free to ignore its advice if they believe that the advice is tainted, and institutions do often ignore its advice, especially the larger institutions and especially on higher profile issues.
211
Glass Lewis is also charged with conflicts of interest because it is owned by Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board and Alberta Investment Management Corp. 212 Glass Lewis denies that these relationships pose any problem because it operates independently of its owners. 213 As with ISS's Chinese Wall between its proxy advisory and corporate governance consulting services, the adequacy of Glass Lewis's separation from its owners cannot be judged by direct observation because no formal division can prevent the parties from collaborating if they wish to do so. We can only observe whether Glass Lewis's advice seems to be biased. The affected partiesGlass Lewis's clients-are not complaining, so neither should anyone else.
There is considerable irony and audacity in the complaints about proxy advisors' supposed conflicts of interest. "Shareholder activists have long complained that mutual fund and asset management companies have an inherent conflict of interest, since they may be managing company retirement plans, or hoping to gain access to them." 214 One function of proxy advisors is to give these 215 The critics of ISS make no complaint about this conflict of interest, which inclines many institutional investors to vote with management. They complain only when there may be a conflict of interest that might lead to votes against management.
Only corporate managers and their mouthpieces are complaining about ISS's conflicts of interest. It seems likely that their concern is not any injury to institutional investors or their beneficiaries since they have not shown any such injury. What seems to bother them is that proxy advisors have helped to loosen the executives' domination of shareholder voting.
VI. FURTHER REGULATORY PROPOSALS
It has been recommended that an oversight board be created for the proxy advisory industry similar to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Boards (PCAOB) with power to promulgate and enforce industry standards and to conduct inspections. 216 However, the accounting industry is very different. PCAOB was created because investors lost billions of dollars from accounting fraud and from corporate actions that were not revealed by auditors because they were not caught by existing accounting and auditing practices.
217 By contrast, there has been no showing of losses to investors from the actions of proxy advisors.
investor category" and describing these conflicts nothing wrong with such a code if the advisor firms can agree on one. However, additional burdens imposing higher costs would weigh more heavily on smaller firms, 221 and forbidding firms from offering corporate governance advice would strike deeply at ISS but not at the advisors who do not offer such services. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that self-regulation can go very far.
CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, the balance of power in corporate governance has shifted; corporate managers no longer dominate the process as they once did. A major reason for this change is the rise of proxy advisors, who have enabled institutional investors to exercise their shareholder franchise intelligently at a reasonable cost. Corporate managers resent being dethroned and have sought to hobble proxy advisors with various regulations. Of course, proxy advisors are imperfect-like all human institutions. However, on balance they perform a significant and beneficial role.
The conduct of proxy advisors has also been challenged in Europe. The European Securities and Markets Authority inquired and decided against imposing new rules, although it did recommend that proxy advisors cooperate to develop better policies with respect to transparency, accuracy, and conflicts of interest. 222 This is a sound approach. Every industry should always be encouraged to improve its performance, but regulation should be imposed only when the evidence strongly suggests that its benefits will outweigh its costs. The regulations proposed for proxy advisors do not meet that test.
To repeat, the supposed victims of proxy advisors' shortcomings are institutional investors and their own shareholders or beneficiaries, and none of them are complaining. If, however, someone believes there are problems here, one solution would be to consult those shareholders. 223 It is not practical that each could give
